{"data":{"description":"The Role of Sir William Johnson In the Colonial Development of America and His Involvement in the Expansionist Policies of the British Imperial Government.","title":"Sir William Johnson, Indian Superintendent: Colonial ...","post_type":"page","content":"\u003ch2\u003eThe Role of Sir William Johnson In the Colonial Development of America and His Involvement in the Expansionist Policies of the British Imperial Government.\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"byline\"\u003eBy Paul Redmond Drew\u003c/p\u003e\r\nAS THE TITLE STATES, this essay will look closely at Johnson's role in the colonial development of America, and particularly the key concern over westward expansion. This became fundamentally linked with the differing views the British government and the colonial authorities held, over how this expansion should be managed, and in particular the financial cost of such a policy. This led, inexorably it seems, to the wider issues that then escalated into the Revolution and the fight for independence. Although Johnson died before the Revolution actually started, he was a key participant in the events that led up to this break with Britain, and as such the motives and actions of this man can give a picture of how the colonies and Britain viewed the future of America.\r\n\r\nThis essay will look briefly at his early life in America, and then in more detail at the military and political career of Johnson, and particularly his involvement with the Indians, in his capacity as Superintendent of Indian Affairs, which was central to the British concerns over colonial expansion, and how that was to be managed. The military career of Johnson naturally evolved around his relationship with the Indians, especially the Six Nations, and earned him great success and wealth, after his victories at Lake George and Niagara. His political career progressed alongside his military one, and again was linked to his relationship with the Indians, through his appointment as Indian Superintendent. His relationship with the authorities in London, the colonial authorities, the settlers and traders, and with the Indians themselves, will be examined to form a portrait of Johnson, and how he saw the situation regarding westward expansion and all its implications for Britain and his adopted country, America. Finally some conclusions will be given based on Johnson's handling of his difficult task, and how this affected subsequent events.\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"divimgleft\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca href=\"/earlyamerica/early-america-review/volume-1/sir-william-johnson-indian-superintendent-colonial/johnson\"\u003e\u003cimg class=\"size-full wp-image-4556\" src=\"/images/earlyamerica/johnson.jpg\" alt=\"Sir William Johnson\" width=\"182\" height=\"260\" /\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cp\u003e Sir William Johnson\u003cbr /\u003ecirca 1751\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\nAT THE AGE OF TWENTY-THREE Johnson left Ireland to seek his own way in\r\nAmerica. He was aided by his uncle, Peter Warren, and went to the colonies with others\r\nwho had decided to start afresh in the New World. Johnson's ability to get along with\r\npeople and motivate them was rewarded soon after he arrived: in 1738 he had taken\r\ntwelve families over to settle on his uncle's land in the Mohawk River valley; by 1742\r\nthere were twenty-six leases in operation. Johnson became a merchant, dealing and\r\ntrading with the Indians, and building up, through trust and goodwill, the relationship\r\nthat was to be the focal point of his life in America and also the main contributor to his\r\nsubsequent fame and success. He bought his own land, across the river from his uncle's\r\nproperty, and continued to expand his business interests, which were mainly concerned\r\nwith the fur trade and supplying the settlers in the Mohawk valley. This business gave\r\nJohnson the opportunity to understand the Indians: it was his special relationship with\r\nthe Six Nations, and specifically with the Mohawks of the Iroquois Confederacy, that led\r\nhim into the political and military arenas, and was to influence his subsequent ideas of\r\nhow the colonies should manage the whole question of trade and expansion. This\r\nquality was early on recognised by the political leaders of the two colonies Johnson was\r\nprimarily concerned with - Massachusetts and New York. In 1746 Governor Clinton of\r\nNew York gave Johnson the task of supplying the vital garrison at Oswego. In the same\r\nyear Johnson was appointed Commissary for Indian Affairs. Governor Shirley also saw\r\nJohnson's ability in dealing with the Indians; in 1754 he wrote to Johnson stating he\r\nwould recommend him to be appointed in the capacity best suited to his talent. The\r\nresult was that in 1755 Johnson received a warrant of appointment as Superintendent of\r\nIndian Affairs, with full powers to treat with the Confederate Nations in the British\r\ninterest, from the Commander - in - Chief, Major General Braddock.\r\n\r\nAS WELL AS THIS POLITICAL ROLE Johnson had acquired a military one also. In 1746\r\nhe was made 'Colonel of the Forces to be raised out of the Six Nations'. The war with\r\nFrance that had begun in 1743, was concerned with the question of supremacy in North\r\nAmerica, and as such naturally involved two of the subjects Johnson was most familiar\r\nwith. Trade and the situation of the Indians in the area around the Great Lakes, were\r\nfundamental to the dispute. The role of the Indian tribes was therefore a vital one in\r\nany conflict between the two antagonists. The long standing feud between them meant\r\nthat the support of the Indians was a key element; for this reason a brief description of\r\nthe composition of the tribes and how they were disposed to the British would be in\r\norder.\r\n\r\nIn 1701 the Five Nations, that is the Iroquois Confederacy (Mohawks, Oneidas,\r\nOnandagas, Cayugas and Senecas), had made peace with the French at Montreal, and\r\nremained neutral. In subsequent decades attempts by the British to win over the Indians\r\nhad been countered by the French; in 1720 they came across Lake Ontario and built a\r\ntrading post at Niagara. To counter this threat the British built a post at Oswego in 1727.\r\nAny war between the two therefore would see the Indians acting as a pivot, and so be\r\nassidously courted to act for either side in any future conflict. When Johnson was\r\nchosen to enlist the help of the Five Nations (later becoming the Six Nations, with the\r\nTuscaroras joining the Confederacy), he had already been welcomed by them as\r\nsomeone who would treat them in an honest and straightforward manner. Qualities of\r\nloyalty, honesty and respect for friends and families were appreciated by the Indians;\r\nthey found them in Johnson, so much so that they named him Warraghiyagey ('doer of\r\ngreat things or 'chief big business'), and in 1760 bestowed the title of sachem\r\n(administrative chief) on him. Johnson's close connections with the Mohawks was due\r\nin part to the influence of Hendrik, a sachem of the tribe. In 1709 - 1710 he had travelled\r\nto England and been received by Queen Anne; in 1740 he went again, and became a\r\nChristian also. Highly eloquent he became a spokesman for the Iroquois and a firm\r\nfriend of Johnson. The years before the outbreak of the French and Indian War in 1754,\r\nsaw several Councils and Conferences held between the colonial authorities and the\r\nIndian tribes. In 1746 Johnson as Indian negotiator was present at a conference in\r\nAlbany; his aim, as ordered by Clinton, was to get the Indians to participate in the war.\r\nHamilton states that this was agreeable to Johnson since he closely identified with them,\r\neven to dressing like them, and, as Hamilton put it, ' he showed them that he meant to\r\njoin them in the war by the acts which were most significant in their eyes'.\u003ca href=\"#1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\nIT WAS THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR that made Johnson's name - and in\r\nparticular the disastrous year 1755, which was relieved by the only success, when\r\nJohnson fought off an attack by the French, under von Dieskau, and in the process\r\ncaptured the Baron. Braddock's defeat on the Monongahela River, showed how\r\nimportant it was to instil loyalty in the Indians; by sheer tactlessness Braddock had\r\nalienated the one hundred Delawares that Johnson's deputy George Croghan had\r\nmanaged to get him for his campaign. They left him and returned to their own lands,\r\nleaving only a few Iroquois scouts. Being ignorant of the ways of backwoods fighting,\r\nBraddock attacked a smaller force in a frontal assault that was doomed to fail. In this\r\nbattle he was killed and so the role of Commander - in - Chief was taken by Governor\r\nShirley. His expedition to Niagara was itself doomed after Braddock's defeat; he still\r\ninterfered with Johnson's campaign, by taking away both colonial militia and Indians\r\nfrom his force. He also tried to interfere with Johnson's role as Colonel of the Six\r\nNations by appointing one of his agents, Lydius, as Colonel over the Six Nations also.\r\nJohnson, although recognising Shirley's right to assume the command of the forces, did\r\nnot accept the usurpation of his role in managing Indian affairs. The campaign to Lake\r\nGeorge showed Johnson at his best; he ensured his men were disciplined and ready to\r\nfight by using persuasion rather than force. Although Johnson lost more than 220 men\r\nand both his deputy commander, Colonel Williams, and his friend Hendrik, the French\r\nlost their commander von Dieskau and three hundred to four hundred men; just as\r\nimportantly, they were halted in their advance on British territory. Johnson's action\r\nwas seen as a welcome change after all the disaster's of the campaign so far, so welcome\r\nin fact that Johnson received a baronetcy from the King and £5,000 from the\r\ngovernment. Equally importantly Johnson's political prospects rose accordingly.\r\nInfluential friends such as Watts, De Lancey and Thomas Pownall gathered in New\r\nYork to assist him in his career. In February 1756 he received his appointment as Sole\r\nAgent and Superintendent of Indians and their Affairs, and the instructions he received\r\ngave him greater control than had applied hitherto. He was to ensure that no\r\nindependent transactions were allowed with the Indians, and was only subordinate to\r\nthe instructions from London, not the colonial governors, through the Commander - in\r\n- Chief.\r\n\r\nThe following year saw further disasters for the British. The loss of Oswego with sixteen\r\nhundred men, was a considerable blow to the British. The fur trade was lost, with the\r\nIndians taking their pelts to Niagara and Frontenac rather than Oswego, and just as\r\nseriously the confidence of the Indians in the British suffered as well. In July of the\r\nsame year further disaster struck. Montcalm attacked and took Fort William Henry,\r\nafter a heroic defence by Colonel Monro. The Indian allies of the French, though,\r\nshowed how unstable they could be as allies - they massacred the garrison while\r\nMontcalm vainly tried to limit the atrocities committed. In 1758 Abercromby took over\r\nfrom Lord Loudon as Commander - in - Chief but seemed to be made of the same stock\r\nas the previous incumbents. In a drive on Ticonderoga he took on Montcalm, who had\r\nthree thousand six hundred men, with a force of sixteen thousand men - and lost!. By\r\nattempting a frontal assault, without the support of artillery, he lost two thousand men\r\nin a vain attempt to dislodge the French. He then panicked and retreated, still with\r\nabout twelve thousand men. The Indians again had seen a British collapse, which left\r\nJohnson with a lot of work to try and persaude them that this was not a mortal blow to\r\nthe British campaign against the French.\r\n\r\nBefore too long Johnson had something tangible he could use to sway the Indians over\r\nto the British side. Bradstreet led a campaign in 1758 to attack Fort Frontenac, which not\r\nonly succeeded, but had devestating results on the French plan of attack. He not only cut\r\ntheir supply lines, but captured two supply ships, which he loaded with stores and took\r\nacross to the American side of Lake Ontario. The French were therefore forced back on\r\nNiagara, having to abandon Fort Duquesne. A further change of Commander - in -\r\nChief brought to the fore the man who was to finally drive the French out of North\r\nAmerica. Jeffrey Amherst was a good soldier, well liked by his men and the colonial\r\ngovernments, but had one trait that gave Johnson many problems. He thought the\r\nIndians beneath consideration and therefore not worthy of special treatment. Their\r\nworth was proved by Johnson when he took part in the Niagara campaign. He raised\r\nseven hundred Iroquois and 244 other Indians for this attack, a force that was to play a\r\ndecisive part in the defeat of the French. After a lengthy siege the fort was close to being\r\ntaken, but then on the 21 July 1759 the commander of the British forces, Brigadier\r\nGeneral Prideaux, was killed by one of his own cannon, leaving Johnson in command.\r\nThe question of whether he was technically the senior ranking officer, Lt. Colonel\r\nHaldimand in Oswego possibly being senior, since he was a regular, as opposed to a\r\ncolonial, soldier, was debatable. Johnson was in the right place at the right time:\r\nHaldimand arrived on the 28 July to dispute the command, but by then the fort had\r\nbeen taken. The French had tried to mount an attack to reinforce it, but thanks to his\r\nIroquois scouts, Johnson was ready for them. In sharp contrast to the earlier events at\r\nFort William Henry, Johnson ensured that his captives were well treated, even giving\r\nthem shoes, stockings and blankets for the long journey to New York and then England.\r\nThe following year was to see the final defeat of the French. Again, Johnson raised a\r\nforce of six hundred Indians to take part in the campaign to take Montreal. On the 8\r\nSeptember 1760 Vaudreiul the Governor General of Canada surrendered all claims to\r\nthe North American territories held, including Detroit, Michillimackinac, Sault Ste.\r\nMarie, St. Joseph and Green Bay.\r\n\r\nJOHNSON'S PART IN THIS WAR, and the succeeding years in which he played such a decisive part, were primarily due to his position as Indian Superintendent. The events\r\nthat led up to this post being created reveal some of the ministry's thinking on\r\nAmerican colonial expansion, and therefore are worth looking at in finer detail. Alden\r\nin his article on the creation of the Indian Superintendencies, mentions that as early as\r\n1721 the Board of Trade devised a plan to invest the conduct of Indian relations in a\r\ngovernor-general.\u003ca href=\"#2\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e By the time Clinton was\r\nGovernor of New York in 1746 the Indian Commissioners in Albany were proving inadequate for the task; Johnson was therefore\r\nasked, since he had a good relationship with the Indians, to regulate the trade with\r\nthem. Clinton also wrote to Newcastle stating he should be given, as Governor, powers\r\nto handle all such matters, when other duties permitted. Both he and Shirley, the\r\nGovernor of Massachusetts, wrote to the Board of Trade on 18 August 1748 stating that\r\nJohnson was the ideal candidate to handle Indian affairs.\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e'one or more suitable\r\npersons to inform themselves of everything which may be useful (either by gaining or preserving the Friendship of those [Six] Nations) for promoting\r\ntrade among them and for preventing their being abused \u0026 cheated in their Trade'.\u003ca href=\"#3\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e3\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\nThree years later the term 'Superintendant (sic) of Indian Affairs' was used by Archibald\r\nKennedy, a member of the New York Council; in an article entitled 'The importance of\r\nGaining and Preserving the Friendship of the Indians to the British Interest,\r\nConsidered' he urged confederation of the colonies, establishment of a barrier colony\r\nagainst the French and a unified Indian policy.\u003ca href=\"#4\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e4\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This plan would be financed by duties levied in England on Indian trade goods sent to America and on furs imported from the colonies. His plan was sent to Cadwallader Colden, the Lieutenant Governor of New\r\nYork, who prepared a report for the Board of Trade. It was necessary for such a plan\r\nsince the Indians were becoming increasingly vocal in their complaints against land\r\nseizures and excessive sale of rum to get them to sign away their lands. This was a real\r\nthreat since rum was seen as a food by the Indians; Hendrik and Abraham Peters, while\r\ndrunk on rum, had signed the deed to the Connecticut Purchase at the Albany Congress,\r\nand although this was repudiated later, since an individual could not sign away tribal\r\nland, it being held on a communal basis, the damage to Indian/colonial relations was\r\ngreat.\u003ca href=\"#5\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e5\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\nTHE ALBANY CONGRESS WAS HELD in June 1754 as a result of the Board of Trade\r\ncalling for such a meeting to rectify abuses in the administration of Indian affairs.\r\nThomas Pownall gave a brief talk, mentioning the fact that the Iroquois were coalescing\r\ninto a nation, and ready to concentrate their affections on some 'agent' or 'stateholder'.\u003ca href=\"#6\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e6\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Johnson also spoke at this meeting, on measures necessary to be taken with the Six\r\nNations, and other matters relating to defeating the designs of the French, in respect of\r\nwhich he stressed the importance of securing the aid of the Six Nations, a statement that\r\nshowed how strongly he identified with them.\r\n\u003ctable style=\"width: 336px; display: block; float: left; clear: left; margin: 6px 18px 8px 0;\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctbody\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u003cscript src=\"//pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/js/adsbygoogle.js\" async=\"\"\u003e\u003c/script\u003e\u003c!-- 336x280-ATF-3-6-13 --\u003e \u003cins class=\"adsbygoogle\" style=\"display: inline-block; width: 336px; height: 280px;\" data-adsbygoogle-status=\"done\" data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-2109659921488806\" data-ad-slot=\"8941881031\"\u003e\u003cins id=\"aswift_4_expand\" style=\"display: inline-table; border: none; height: 280px; margin: 0; padding: 0; position: relative; visibility: visible; width: 336px; background-color: transparent;\"\u003e\u003cins id=\"aswift_4_anchor\" style=\"display: block; border: none; height: 280px; margin: 0; padding: 0; position: relative; visibility: visible; width: 336px; background-color: transparent;\"\u003e\u003ciframe id=\"aswift_4\" style=\"left: 0; position: absolute; top: 0;\" name=\"aswift_4\" width=\"336\" height=\"280\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\"\u003e\u003c/iframe\u003e\u003c/ins\u003e\u003c/ins\u003e\u003c/ins\u003e\u003cscript\u003e// \u003c![CDATA[\r\n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});\r\n// ]]\u003e\u003c/script\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/tbody\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\u0026nbsp;\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e'The Eyes of all the Western Tribes of Indians are upon the behaviour of the Six\r\nNations, whose fame of power, may in some measure exceed the reality, while they act a\r\ntimid and neutral part'.\u003ca href=\"#7\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e7\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\nHe went on to outline how the designs of the French could be thwarted:\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e'Now to hinder the incursions of the French, and to revive the Spirits of the Six\r\nNations and their allies, nothing can conduce more to those desirable ends, than first,\r\nestablishing Garrisons in the most commodious places among them'.\u003ca href=\"#8\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e8\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\nJohnson's long term aims can be seen by the further suggestions he put forward:\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e'There should be some English continually residing in every Nation, whether Military\r\nOfficers, or others, to keep up a continued correspondence'.\u003ca href=\"#9\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e9\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n' . . . the Indians must think there can be no union in our Councils, when it has been\r\nknown more than once, that the Six Nations have been invited to a conference by\r\ndifferent colonies at the same time. This looks among the Indians, as tho' our Measures\r\nwere not mutual, and occasions them to be divided in their Councils also, being\r\ndoubtful of our acting with vigour and unanimity ettc. (sic) against the French'.\u003ca href=\"#10\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e10\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\nOn the 2nd of July Chief Abraham of the Mohawks made a plea for Johnson to be made\r\nagent to the Six Nations. Another spokesman told the Congress 'If he [Johnson] fails us,\r\nwe die',stressed the affection for him, and hinted that the French were plotting to\r\nassasinate or abduct him.\u003ca href=\"#11\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e11\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Alden mentions here the\r\nsuggestion (but not who actually suggests it) that Johnson himself inspired these praises from the Indians to get the\r\nappointment as Superintendent. Whatever the truth of this, the Journal of Congress,\r\nPownall's papers and Johnson's report were sent to the Board of Trade on 22 July,\r\narriving there on 24 October.\r\n\r\nIn London, Halifax, in April of the same year, was preparing a report on the\r\nIndian/French situation. This report, stipulating the need for forts to be built, and a\r\nchange in the handling of Indian relations, was sent to Sir Thomas Robinson, the\r\nSecretary of State for the Southern Department. By 29 October the Board of Trade was\r\nurging that a royal official be chosen to manage Indian affairs, with Johnson specifically\r\nnamed as the candidate best suited for the task. The importance of the Albany Congress\r\ncan be seen as a deciding factor in changing the views of the Board of Trade. On 9\r\nAugust they had been thinking of having a military commander, with the powers of a\r\ncommissary-general for Indian affairs, sent to the colonies. The receipt of the Congress\r\ndocuments altered their perception of the problem and made them decide instead to\r\nchoose a civilian official - Johnson. As Alden states in his explanation, 'impending war\r\nmeant that centralization of Indian affairs was indispensable',\u003ca href=\"#12\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e12\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e and therefore the Board\r\nof Trade, backed by the request of the Six Nations, and the recommendations of Clinton\r\nand Shirley, chose a single agent to manage the Northern and Southern Department's\r\nof Indian Affairs.\r\n\r\nTHIS ENCOURAGEMENT OF\r\nJOHNSON'S VIEWS was not to last however. The\r\nProclamation of 1763 was an attempt by the imperial government to overcome the\r\nproblems the administration of such a vast territory posed for the government.\r\nProblems with the Indians (the Cherokee Indian War had ended two years earlier) and\r\nthe French Canadians, meant the government in London had to assume responsibility\r\nfor maintaining a regular army in the trans Appalachian region, since the colonial\r\ngovernments were not willing to accept this themselves.\u003ca href=\"#13\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e13\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Building on the promises\r\nof the Treaty of Easton in 1758, the Proclamation of 1763 laid down that all the lands and\r\nterritories 'lying to the westward of the Sources of the Rivers which fall into the Sea\r\nfrom the West and North West' should be reserved for the use of Indians. Also pledges\r\nmade to the Indians at subsequent treaties would be respected, the advantages of the\r\nIndian trade would be spread among all the colonies and those that had served in the\r\nWar would be given land, but in such a way as to honour pledges given to the\r\nIndians.\u003ca href=\"#14\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e14\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This Proclamation,\r\naccepted by the King and approved on 8 October can be seen as the first major development\r\nthat led up to the administration of Indian affairs\r\nbeing returned to the control of the colonies. Although the two Superintendents were\r\nempowered to control trade between the Indians and the white traders, the abuses of the\r\nsystem were still considerable. The Proclamation had set up a temporary boundary; this\r\nwas flouted either by those genuinely wishing to settle further west, or by illegal traders\r\nand speculators hoping to make a fortune from the Indian lands. Johnson's views sent\r\nto the Board of Trade for their consideration, and expressed in the plan of 1764, included\r\nthe suggestion that the Indians should continue to be subsidised by presents, and that\r\nthe Superintendent's, through their respective Departments, should have more control\r\nof Indian affairs. However this raised two concerns; Sosin mentions these in his work\r\non British colonial policy towards the Middle West. Firstly, would the ministry be able\r\nto raise the revenue necessary to finance the imperial establishment?, and secondly,\r\nwould the colonists accept this imperial regulation?\u003ca href=\"#15\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e15\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Regarding this question of\r\ncost Johnson (and Stuart in the Southern Department) advocated a tax on furs: the\r\nCommisssioners of the Board of Trade thought this would be difficult to collect and\r\nwould hinder trade, whilst Governor Murray of Quebec also objected to the plan,\r\nespecially the tariffs of prices and the proposed tax, but carried out his instructions to\r\nadher to the policy that was laid down. The traders in Canada were so alarmed about\r\nthis plan that they agitated strongly for its abandonment. In 1766 Murray was recalled to\r\nLondon, by which time the plan had lost official support in England.\u003ca href=\"#16\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e16\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Governor\r\nBernard of Massachusetts argued for a distinction between control of Indians inside and\r\noutside provincial boundaries, and did not wish to see Johnson as 'a governor within\r\nmy government'.\u003ca href=\"#17\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e17\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\nThe Board of Trade themselves took a considerable length of time to come to any firm\r\nconclusions about the plans for managing Indian affairs. On the 11 May 1764 Croghan,\r\nJohnson's deputy, sent Johnson a letter from London explaining this delay:\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e'I have been here three Months this Day and no Doubt you will be surprised to hear that\r\nthire Lordshipes have Neaver Taken under Thire Consideration Indian affairs Nor\r\nEven has the State of yr. Department wh. you sent by Me been Read att ye. Board'.\u003ca href=\"#18\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e18\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\nAs mentioned earlier the main stumbling block was the question of finance; Johnson\r\nwas continually being pressed to keep expenses to the minimum. In a letter written to\r\nJohnson from New York in March 1765 Gage, the Commander-in-Chief, stated:\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e'I don't know whether you received a Minute of the Treasury dated the 28th of Novr.\r\nlast from the Board of Trade or any other office. But I have received orders to incur no\r\nExpence, till first approved by the King. Your Department is not yet fixed by King or\r\nParliament'.\u003ca href=\"#19\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e19\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\nLater on in the month Gage wrote to Johnson to express concern over a draught of\r\n£2643 8s 3d from Croghan, and stating that the Treasury expected authentic vouchers\r\nand detailed accounts of presents purchased for the Indians.\u003ca href=\"#20\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e20\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\nJohnson's insistence on the need to continue these gifts of presents was very much\r\nconcerned with the situation should the Indians' goodwill be lost. He argued that only\r\nby proper and regular trade with the Indians could they be kept loyal to the Crown;\r\nillegal French traders were always ready to win back the Indians by undermining the\r\nauthority of the British. Also the question of settlers west of the line set by the\r\nProclamation of 1763 was causing friction. Some grants of land had been made by\r\nVirginia before the outbreak of the French and Indian War, but the Proclamation made\r\nthese illegal. In 1766, though, the Auditor-General for the Plantations, Robert\r\nCholmondely, was insisting the settlers pay quit-rents for the same lands.\u003ca href=\"#21\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e21\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Attacks by\r\nsettlers on the Indians added to the considerable problems both Gage and Johnson had\r\nto surmount. The ministry in London reacted differently to these issues. Barrington, the\r\nSecretary-at-War, put forward a plan to do away with forts in the interior; the Indians\r\nwould have to travel to the seaboard colonies to trade, and control of their affairs would\r\nbe returned to the colonial governments.\u003ca href=\"#22\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e22\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Shelburne had a more\r\nambiguous position; he upheld the Proclamation of 1763 but also attempted to alter the imperial program for\r\nthe interior. He saw the solution in terms of keeping a few of the interior forts, and\r\nestablishing new colonies, which, when self sufficient, would help defray the costs of\r\nthe original settlements. Also less troops would be needed, four battalions instead of\r\nfifteen. Whatever plan was adopted the central point about the cost of such a policy was\r\nalways uppermost. Barrington estimated in January 1767 that for the coming year the\r\ncosts of the American garrisons would be £400,000; income, since the repeal of the\r\nStamp Act and reduction of import duties, would be no more than £80,000.\u003ca href=\"#23\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e23\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\nAs mentioned above Johnson saw clearly the problems of regulating the Indian trade,\r\nand as a consequence, the settlers and traders themselves. He consistently advocated a\r\ncontrol over the business of dealing with the Indians. In September 1761 he had written\r\nto all the officers at western posts instructing them on how the Indian affairs were to be\r\ncontrolled.\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e'The officer to keep up a good understanding with all Inds who live near his Post, and\r\nwth. those who may resort thither on Business, and see no Injustice is done them in\r\nTrade or Otherwise'.\u003ca href=\"#24\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e24\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\nIn May 1762 he wrote to Amherst, the Commander-in-Chief, mentioning the problems\r\nof the settlers (of the Susquehanna Company), and of his meeting with the Six Nations\r\nin April of that year.\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e'Your Excellency will observe in these Transactions the great Jealousy of the Indians\r\nwith regard to their Lands, \u0026 particularly their uneasiness concerning the designs of\r\nsome Connecticut people . . . gone to Settle on a large tract of country on the\r\nSusquehanna River'.\u003ca href=\"#25\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e25\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\nJOHNSON'S CONCERNS were seen to be correct when in 1763 Pontiac's rebellion\r\nthreatened to do what the French had failed to achieve. The Indians rising resentment\r\nthat their lands were being taken, and the lack of presents and other more essential\r\ngoods, such as food, implements and ammunition, led Pontiac, an Ottawa chief, to\r\npersaude Chippewas, Delawares, Shawnees and Senecas to attack Detroit and other forts\r\nin the area. Not all of the Western Tribes were involved, the Huron for example\r\nremaining neutral in the conflict, nor was it a simultaneous rising. However, many\r\nforts were taken, with their inhabitants either killed, often brutally, or captured.\r\nJohnson, being notified of the rising on the 5 June 1763 wrote to Amherst on the 6th\r\nand also wrote to the Lords of Trade and Plantations mentioning the underlying state of\r\naffairs he thought was responsible for this rebellion. In July he held a meeting with the\r\nSix Nations at German Flats to try and negotiate with the Indians a peace settlement. In\r\nSeptember a conference was held at Johnson Hall, with Johnson throwing down the\r\nhatchet to get the Indians to stay loyal to the Crown. In 1764 a peace conference was held\r\nat Niagara with fourteen hundred Indians present. Writing to Colden in August\r\nJohnson described his dealings with the Western Nations; he strengthened the\r\nCovenant Chain with them and won agreement, not only for the return of all prisoners\r\ntaken but restitution for the traders losses.\u003ca href=\"#26\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e26\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\nHe then went on to talk about the renewal of trade:\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e'I told them repeatedly their loss of Trade must be charged upon the Enemy, . . . ,\r\nhowever I know nothing will contribute more to keep them at peace, than the letting\r\nthem have a Trade carried on by Honest Men'.\u003ca href=\"#27\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e27\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\nJohnson's concerns over the boundary line as it affected trade were therefore of\r\ncontinuing concern to ensure that the situation did not revert to that of 1763. The Board\r\nof Trade plan of 1764 that Johnson favoured would ensure this full regulation of Indian\r\naffairs, but at a cost. The plan provided for the appointment of deputies, commissaries,\r\ninterpreters and smiths, and the traders restricted to designated posts. This though\r\nposed a dilemma for Gage; he did not have enough men to police the western forts and\r\nkeep troops in the east. As Marshall states in his article 'Colonial Protest and Imperial\r\nRetrenchment', Pontiac's rising had shown that small detachments were vulnerable:\r\nlittle wonder then that Gage wished to pull out of as many western forts as possible.\r\nMarshall describes the situation in the colonies when he states, 'By the close of 1765\r\nimperial authority had been denied in the east and remained undefined in the west: on\r\nboth counts Indian policy suffered, its deficiencies in status and efficacy only too\r\napparent'.\u003ca href=\"#28\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e28\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The situation in London,\r\nwith Barrington and Shelburne both appearing to favour different solutions to the problems of the West, gave Gage the excuse for not\r\nwholeheartedly endorsing Johnson's views on full regulation of Indian affairs. The\r\nevents of 1765, when the Stamp Act crisis came to a head, ensured that the Board of\r\nTrade plan would never be fully implemented. The ministry knew that it would be\r\nimpossible to increase the tax burden by having such a regulated plan: the\r\nCommander-in-Chief had therefore to include the running of the Indian Department\r\nout of his military expenditure. In 1766 Shelburne, now Secretary of State, after a change\r\nof ministry brought about by the Stamp Act crisis, put both the 1764 plan and\r\nBarrington's ideas to his adviser Richard Jackson for comment. He found them both\r\nimpracticable to operate. Shelburne wrote to Johnson on 11 December 1766, referring to\r\nJohnson's plan for the management of Indian affairs, a letter that seems to sum up his\r\nfeelings on the subject:\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e'The Importance of the subject demands, that it should be extremely well weighed \u0026\r\ndigested before adopted . . . The Plan which you refer to, for the better Management of\r\nIndian Affairs requires nice Examination, being of a very dubious Nature in many of it's\r\nmost essential points'.\u003ca href=\"#29\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e29\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\nThis examination was obviously still under consideration, when Shelburne wrote to\r\nJohnson on 20 June 1767 mentioning the King's 'entire Approbation of your conduct,\r\nand His Reliance on your Prudence and Ability to prevent the growth of Abuses in your\r\nDepartment, till the system of Regulations which I mentioned to you in my former\r\nletters can be finally settled'.\u003ca href=\"#30\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e30\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\nJohnson continued to press the Board of Trade and Shelburne for any sign of being able\r\nto prevent the abuses the Indians were complaining of, and specifically with regard to\r\nthe boundary line, it being only temporary. In October 1767 he wrote to Shelburne:\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e'The Indians with whom I met in Congress were very desirous to know whether I had\r\nreceived any satisfactory accounts from court respecting the intended boundary line, the\r\nsummary process for justice, the grievances concerning lands, Murders and intrusions\r\nof the frontier inhabitants, and other matters whenever they were promised relief . . . I\r\ncannot promise myself much from my answer to them, or any other steps I have been\r\nable to take in consequence hereof, having hitherto made use of all the arguments in\r\nmy power to prevail upon them to wait patiently the arrangement of these affairs'.\u003ca href=\"#31\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e31\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\nA further blow to Johnson's hopes of London supporting his ideas also came in 1767\r\nwhen Townshend, the Chancellor, threatened to resign if troops were not returned to\r\nthe east and the management of Indian affairs returned to the control of the colonies\r\nthemselves. Given this expression of concern, Shelburne had to admit that the costs of\r\nrunning the service were high and still rising. As examples of this high cost of the\r\nIndian Departments, Marshall mentions one Edward Cole, appointed commissary at the\r\nIllinois by Johnson in July 1766. In the summer of that year he submitted an account for\r\n£1,568 for presents, a house and personal needs, and then put in a further claim of\r\n£3,000. Gage refused to pay this second sum, so Cole replied by submitting a further\r\nclaim for £7,020!\u003ca href=\"#32\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e32\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Little wonder that in\r\nMarch 1768 the Board of Trade review (started in October 1767) concluded that regulation\r\nof Indian affairs be returned to the colonies.\r\n\r\nIn 1768 Johnson was notified of the change in policy. The final plan was evolved by the\r\nBoard of Trade and drawn up when Hillsborough replaced Shelburne, and a new\r\nAmerican department created. This plan returned the government of Indian affairs to\r\nthe individual colonies; other matters, such as land purchases, holding Congresses,\r\nmaking treaties and laying down boundaries, would continue to be handled by the\r\nSuperintendents. This last reference about the boundaries became the key point when\r\nJohnson signed the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768 to permanently fix a boundary line.\r\n\r\nTHIS TREATY WAS LATER seen as evidence that Johnson had used his immense\r\nprestige with the Indians to get a settlement that was different from that which he was\r\nempowered to seek. It has been suggested by Marshall that because he knew in 1768 his\r\nauthority over the Indians was going to be restricted to a nominally diplomatic role,\r\nJohnson could go into the treaty with a freer hand and make the best possible deal, not\r\nonly for the settlers and traders, but, by extension, for himself. For many years Johnson\r\nhad been seeking to get approval for several land grants: in 1751 he was hoping to get\r\n130,000 acres on the Charlotte River, and in 1760 he had an interest in 80,000 acres on\r\nthe Mohawk River, in partnership with thirty-nine other people. Others were actively\r\ninvolved in this land speculation; Sir Henry Moore, the Governor of New York, was\r\none such interested party, and between 1766 and 1768 a steady flow of petitions for land\r\ncame before the New York Council. Johnson's deputy George Croghan was also\r\ninvolved in land deals, having lost heavily in the French and Indian War and later, in\r\n1763, due to Pontiac's rebellion. In 1765 Johnson had held a meeting with the Indians to\r\ntry and fix a permanent line: they suggested a route that he did not accept, primarily\r\nsince it did not extend across the colony of New York. Also he was not empowered to\r\nofficially fix a permanent boundary. When in December 1767 the Board of Trade finally\r\nagreed to recommend the settlement of the line proposed by the Indians in 1765, and\r\ntransmitted this to Johnson in January 1768, their ideas on the whole question of\r\nAmerican policy were still uncertain. The boundary conference was due to be held in\r\nMay 1768, but due to Johnson's illness was postponed till September.\r\n\r\nThe Board of Trade finished its report in March 1768 and recommended the central\r\nchange of the management of Indian affairs: the return to colonial, rather than\r\nimperial, administration, with the activities of the Indian Departments to be therefore\r\nsharply reduced. Johnson received this news in July and therefore had time to\r\ncontemplate the failure of his attempts to continue to regulate Indian affairs under a\r\ncentral imperial authority. When the Treaty of Fort Stanwix came to be signed Johnson\r\ninsisted on the boundary line being taken across New York, and notified Hillsborough\r\nof this fact, even though he had written to Johnson on 5 January 1768 to confirm that\r\nthe line described in the Board of Trade report should be ratified and confirmed in every\r\npart.\u003ca href=\"#33\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e33\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The conference\r\nopened on the 24 October with 3,102 Indians present. By the 31 October the details had been agreed: the Cherokee River being the western limit, and the\r\nline extended northward to Canada Creek (near Lake Oneida) in upper New York.\r\nJohnson stated that the Indians themselves wished this settlement to make certain the\r\nseparation of Indian and white areas.\r\n\u003ca href=\"#34\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e34\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nHowever various land grants, to Croghan, the traders and to the colony of Pennsylvannia, were also agreed, which incensed Hillsborough and the Board of Trade when they were notified. Hillsborough thought\r\nthat the agreement Johnson had reached would threaten those Stuart, the\r\nSuperintendent for the Southern Department, had concluded. The land grants to the\r\ntraders, although criticised by the Board of Trade, were a consequence of the vociferous\r\ncomplaints by the traders against the losses they had incurred as a result of the late War\r\nand Pontiac's rebellion. Johnson defended this deal by stating that only by placating the\r\ntraders and allowing room for expansion could a friendly and workable relationship, for\r\nthe mutual benefit of whites and Indians, be maintained. Not all claims had been\r\nallowed; John Coxe of Philadelphia had wanted compensation for losses incurred in\r\n1754 and 1763, but eventually agreed to base his claim on 1763 only, since the French had\r\nbeen involved in the earlier dispute, and this would have been more difficult to decide.\r\n\r\nThis treaty was the culmination of Johnson's career - afterwards he concentrated on his\r\nown business, building up his interests in the Mohawk Valley area, and developing\r\nJohnstown by providing settlers with the necessary supplies to establish themselves.\r\nSosin also sees this treaty as the greatest boon to stimulating expansion: the removal of\r\nthe French had allowed expansion west along the Mohawk and its tributaries to the\r\nheadwaters of the Susquehanna and Delaware rivers. The Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768\r\nnow cleared the area between the Mohawk and the Pennsylvannia line. In the\r\nfollowing months speculators took out patents for land along the upper Susquehanna\r\nand Delaware rivers, and many migrated from New York to Pennsylvannia since they\r\nreceived land on better terms from the Proprietary government.\r\n\u003ca href=\"#35\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e35\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\nJohnson himself saw the Treaty as a good one in that the settlement had been honestly\r\nworked out with the Indians in such a way as to clearly show the respective areas of\r\ninterest. From the very beginning of his career as Indian Superintendent, Johnson saw\r\nthis demarcation of interests as essential, if proper trade, settlement and the retention of\r\nthe Indian s own identity, was to continue. One illustration that showed this to be easier\r\nto identify than to put into operation, was the affair over the Oneida and their\r\nchristianisation. Johnson had allowed the Presbyterian ministers, Eleazar Wheelock and\r\nSamuel Kirkland, into their territory, in order to combat the influence of the Jesuits.\r\nHowever the ministers and Johnson saw the Indians in two distinct ways: Wheelock\r\nand Kirkland saw them as fulfilling God's aim of cultivating the land, whereas Johnson\r\nsaw them in a traditional light, as semi-sedentary, with the men as nomadic hunters\r\nand the women as agriculturists. He recognised that trade (and especially the fur trade)\r\ndepended on the Indian being able to hunt. Guzzardo, in his article on this episode, calls\r\nthis the two-zone theory of colonization - distinct Indian lands and areas of white\r\nsettlement.\r\n\u003ca href=\"#36\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e36\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nBetween 1766 - 1768 Wheelock campaigned to get an Indian academy\r\nestablished among the Oneida, and even tried to interfere in the Fort Stanwix\r\nnegotiations to get his way. In 1766 Kirkland set up a mission in Kanowarohare, living\r\namong the Indians and building up a following. However the relationship between\r\nKirkland and Johnson got worse, with the Oneida themselves split, so that it 'created\r\ndivision and destroyed tribal unity'.\r\n\u003ca href=\"#37\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e37\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nGuzzardo states that this feud continued right up\r\nto Johnson's death in 1774, and eventually caused social polarisation, with the Oneida\r\nlosing their warrior spirit and becoming like silly women and children. He concludes\r\nthat when the Revolution came the split was deepened, with many of the tribe staying\r\nloyal to the British and going to Canada.\r\n\u003ca href=\"#38\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e38\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\nJOHNSON'S ROLE OF SUPERINTENDENT then had profound affects on Indian\r\naffairs long after his death. The Board of Trade had long recognised the necessity of preserving\r\nthe friendship of the Five Nations of Indians, 'which are a barrier between his Majesty's\r\nplantations and Canada', and had similarly recognised the importance of the province\r\nof New York, reporting to the House of Commons in 1702, that it was 'esteemed as the\r\ncentre of his Majesty's plantations on the continent'.\r\n\u003ca href=\"#39\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e39\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nJohnson's appointment was\r\ncertainly made in order to preserve both these views, since the problems of\r\nadministering any imperial affairs were fraught with difficulties. The problems the\r\nBritish ministries had in formulating sound policies for the new West, as Gipson points\r\nout, were complicated by factors of distance and time, with a variety of reports coming\r\nfrom the colonies, disputes with the seaboard colonies in the 1760's and 1770's, and the\r\nother problems of Empire, adding to the delays before decisions could be taken.\r\n\u003ca href=\"#40\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e40\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAlden\r\nin his work on the southern department, run by John Stuart, states that the aims of\r\nBritish western policy between 1763 - 1775 were maintenance of peace on the frontier,\r\nand winning and holding of the loyalty of Indians east of the Mississippi.\r\n\u003ca href=\"#41\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e41\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nHe goes on\r\nto state that there were three ways to achieve these aims: firstly, through prevention of\r\nencroachment on the lands of the red man; secondly, through establishment of order in\r\nIndian trade; and thirdly, through Indian diplomacy. Stuart is shown to have pursued\r\nthese objectives with varying success, but with complete loyalty to the programme as a\r\nwhole. Alden contrasts him with Johnson when he states, 'He was also viewed with\r\ncordial dislike by some land speculators because, unlike Johnson, he fought their\r\nschemes . . .'.\r\n\u003ca href=\"#42\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e42\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\nJohnson, though, also attempted, often with much success, to meet these objectives, and\r\noften at a high cost, both personally and financially, to himself. It was Johnson who\r\ncontinually pressed for full recognition of the problems of administering the policy of\r\ntrade and westward expansion. He argued, until the decision went against him, for\r\ncentral control of managing Indian affairs. In the preface to Volume XII of the Johnson\r\nPapers, Albert B. Corey, State Historian and Director, Division of Archives and History,\r\nfor the State of New York, states ' . . . had he lived, yet he might well have so modified\r\npolicies and so influenced both Indians and government as to have profoundly affected\r\nthe course of history'.\r\n\u003ca href=\"#43\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e43\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nPerhaps the last words should belong to Johnson himself.\r\nSeven days before his death, fittingly whilst holding an Indian Congress with the Six\r\nNations, he wrote to Gage, on 4 July 1774, about the decline of Indian relations.\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e'It is a very critical period, . . . , and I must avail myself of Everry thing at such a\r\nJuncture, which requires the utmost exertion of my Influence . . .'.\r\n\u003ca href=\"#44\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e44\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\nHe finishes his letter to Gage with the prophetic words:\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e'. . . I found it necessary to give You a Sketch of the late \u0026 present State of Indian Affairs,\r\n. . . , So much trouble \u0026 attention has greatly effected my Health . . . , but I must make a Sacrifice to the Urgency of the times'.\r\n\u003ca href=\"#45\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e45\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"hr\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003eREFERENCES\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e1\u003c/b\u003e - Milton W. Hamilton, Sir William Johnson: colonial\r\nAmerican, 1715-1763 (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1976), 54.\r\n\u003ca name=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e2\u003c/b\u003e - John R. Alden, The Albany Congress and the creation of the Indian\r\nSuperintendencies. Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXVII, no. 2 (September 1940):\r\n194.\r\n\u003ca name=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e3\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 195.\r\n\u003ca name=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e4\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 195-196.\r\n\u003ca name=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e5\u003c/b\u003e - Arthur Pound, Johnson of the Mohawks: a biography of Sir\r\nWilliam Johnson, Irish Immigrant, Mohawk War Chief, American soldier, Empire Builder (Freeport, N. Y.:\r\nBooks for Libraries Press, 1971), 296.\r\n\u003ca name=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e6\u003c/b\u003e - Alden, The Albany Congress, 198.\r\n\u003ca name=\"7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e7\u003c/b\u003e - E. B. O'Callaghan, Documents relative to the colonial history of\r\nthe State of New York (hereafter referred to as DRCHSNY). VI, (Albany, 1855), 897.\r\n\u003ca name=\"8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e8\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid.\r\n\u003ca name=\"9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e9\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 898.\r\n\u003ca name=\"10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e10\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid.\r\n\u003ca name=\"11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e11\u003c/b\u003e - Alden, The Albany Congress, 198.\r\n\u003ca name=\"12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e12\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 206.\r\n\u003ca name=\"13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e13\u003c/b\u003e - L. H. Gipson, The British Empire before the American Revolution\r\nVol. IX The Triumphant Empire: New Responsibilities within the enlarged Empire 1763-1766 (N. Y.:\r\nKnopf, 1956), 42.\r\n\u003ca name=\"14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e14\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 52.\r\n\u003ca name=\"15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e15\u003c/b\u003e - Jack M. Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness: the Middle West in\r\nBritish colonial policy, 1760 - 1775 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 77.\r\n\u003ca name=\"16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e16\u003c/b\u003e - R. A. Humphreys, ed. Governor Murray's views on the plan of 1764\r\nfor the management of Indian affairs, Canadian Historical Review 16 (1935): 164-165.\r\n\u003ca name=\"17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e17\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 163.\r\n\u003ca name=\"18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e18\u003c/b\u003e - Alexander C. Flick,The papers of Sir William Johnson, (hereafter\r\nreferred to Johnson Papers), Vol. IV, (Albany: University of State of New York, 1925), 419.\r\n\u003ca name=\"19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e19\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 667.\r\n\u003ca name=\"20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e20\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 702-703.\r\n\u003ca name=\"21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e21\u003c/b\u003e - Sosin, Whitehall and the wilderness, 107.\r\n\u003ca name=\"22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e22\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 120.\r\n\u003ca name=\"23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e23\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 130.\r\n\u003ca name=\"24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e24\u003c/b\u003e - James Sullivan, Johnson Papers, Vol. III, (Albany: University of\r\nState of New York, 1921), 527.\r\n\u003ca name=\"25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e25\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 742-743.\r\n\u003ca name=\"26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e26\u003c/b\u003e - Johnson Papers, Vol. IV, 512.\r\n\u003ca name=\"27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e27\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 513.\r\n\u003ca name=\"28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e28\u003c/b\u003e - Peter Marshall, Colonial Protest and Imperial Retrenchment:\r\nIndian Policy, 1764-1768, Journal of American Studies 5 (1971): 5.\r\n\u003ca name=\"29\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e29\u003c/b\u003e - Johnson Papers, Vol. V, (Albany: University of State of New York,\r\n1927), 448.\r\n\u003ca name=\"30\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e30\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 566.\r\n\u003ca name=\"31\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e31\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 762-763.\r\n\u003ca name=\"32\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e32\u003c/b\u003e - Marshall, Colonial Protest, 5.\r\n\u003ca name=\"33\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e33\u003c/b\u003e - O'Callaghan, DRCHSNY, Vol. VIII, (Albany, 1857),2.\r\n\u003ca name=\"34\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e34\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 110.\r\n\u003ca name=\"35\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e35\u003c/b\u003e - Jack M. Sosin, The revolutionary frontier 1763 - 1783 (University of\r\nNew Mexico Press, 1967), 42 - 53.\r\n\u003ca name=\"36\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e36\u003c/b\u003e - John C. Guzzardo, The Superintendent and the Ministers: the\r\nbattle for Oneida allegiances, 1761 - 75, New York History 57 (July, 1976): 263 - 264.\r\n\u003ca name=\"37\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e37\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 270.\r\n\u003ca name=\"38\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e38\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 282 - 283.\r\n\u003ca name=\"39\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e39\u003c/b\u003e - Francis Jennings, The ambiguous Iroquois Empire: the covenant\r\nchain confederation of Indian tribes with english colonies from its beginning to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744,\r\n(W. W. Norton, 1984), 370.\r\n\u003ca name=\"40\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e40\u003c/b\u003e - Gipson, The British Empire before the American Revolution Vol. XI\r\nThe Triumphant Empire: the rumbling of the coming storm, 1766 - 1770 (N. Y.: Knopf, 1956),\r\n418 - 419.\r\n\u003ca name=\"41\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e41\u003c/b\u003e - John R. Alden, John Stuart and the southern colonial frontier: a\r\nstudy of Indian relations, war , trade, and land problems in the southern wilderness 1754 - 1775, (Ann\r\nArbor: University of Michigan Press, 1944), 335.\r\n\u003ca name=\"42\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e42\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 335 - 336.\r\n\u003ca name=\"43\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e43\u003c/b\u003e - Hamilton, Johnson Papers, Vol. XII, viii.\r\n\u003ca name=\"44\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e44\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid, 1116.\r\n\u003ca name=\"45\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003e45\u003c/b\u003e - Ibid.\r\n\r\n\u003chr align=\"left\" width=\"45%\" /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cb\u003eBIBLIOGRAPHY\u003c/b\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr align=\"left\" width=\"45%\" /\u003e\r\n\r\nAlden, John R. John Stuart and the southern colonial frontier: a study of Indian\r\nrelations, war , trade, and land problems in the southern wilderness 1754 - 1775, (Ann\r\nArbor: University of Michigan Press, 1944).\r\n\r\n----. The Albany Congress and the creation of the Indian Superintendencies. Mississippi\r\nValley Historical Review, XXVII, no. 2 (September 1940): 193 -210.\r\n\r\nFlick, Alexander C. The papers of Sir William Johnson, Vol. IV, (hereafter referred to as\r\nJohnson Papers), (Albany: University of State of New York, 1925).\r\n\r\n----. Johnson Papers, Vol. V, (Albany: University of State of New York, 1927).\r\n\r\nGipson, Lawrence H. The British Empire before the American Revolution Vol. IX The\r\nTriumphant Empire: New Responsibilities within the enlarged Empire 1763-1766 (N. Y.:\r\nKnopf, 1956).\r\n\r\n----. The British Empire before the American Revolution Vol. XI The Triumphant\r\nEmpire: The rumbling of the coming storm, 1766 - 1770 (N. Y.: Knopf, 1956).\r\n\r\nGuzzardo, John C. The Superintendent and the Ministers: the battle for Oneida\r\nallegiances, 1761 - 75, New York History 57 (July, 1976): 255 - 283.\r\n\r\nHamilton, Milton W. Sir William Johnson: colonial American, 1715-1763 (Port\r\nWashington: Kennikat Press, 1976).\r\n\r\n----. ed. Johnson Papers, Vol. XII (Albany: University of State of New York, 1957).\r\n\r\nHumphreys, R. A. ed. Governor Murray's views on the plan of 1764 for the\r\nmanagement of Indian affairs, Canadian Historical Review 16 (1935): 162 -169.\r\n\r\nJennings, Francis.The ambiguous Iroquois Empire: the covenant chain confederation of\r\nIndian tribes with english colonies from its beginning to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744,\r\n(London: Norton, 1984).\r\n\r\nMarshall, Peter. Colonial Protest and Imperial Retrenchment: Indian Policy, 1764-1768,\r\nJournal of American Studies 5 (1971): 1 - 17.\r\n\r\n----. Sir William Johnson and the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, 1768, Journal of American\r\nStudies 1 (1967): 149 - 179.\r\n\r\nO'Callaghan, E. B. Documents relative to the colonial history of the State of New York\r\n(hereafter referred to as DRCHSNY). VI, (Albany, 1855).\r\n\r\n----. DRCHSNY, VIII, (Albany, 1855).\r\n\r\nPound, Arthur. Johnson of the Mohawks: a biography of Sir William Johnson, Irish\r\nImmigrant, Mohawk War Chief, American soldier, Empire Builder (Freeport, N. Y.:\r\nBooks for Libraries Press, 1971).\r\n\r\nSosin, Jack M. The revolutionary frontier 1763 - 1783 (University of New Mexico Press,\r\n1967).\r\n\r\n----. Whitehall and the Wilderness: the Middle West in British colonial policy, 1760 -\r\n1775 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961).\r\n\r\nSullivan, James. ed. Johnson Papers, Vol. V (Albany: University of State of New York,\r\n1921).\r\n\r\n\u003c!--ignore_perlfect_search--\u003e","menu":[{"path":"lives-early-america","title":"Famous Lives","submenu":[{"path":"lives-early-america/autobiography-benjamin-franklin","title":"Autobiography of Ben Franklin"},{"path":"lives-early-america/ramsays-life-washington","title":"Ramsay's The Life of Washington"},{"path":"lives-early-america/adventures-col-daniel-boone","title":"The Adventures of Col. 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